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In this paper I examine the New Brunswick Energy Institute’s roundtables for their 
ability to integrate citizen concerns about hydraulic fracturing, those concerns circulating 
within informal domains (e.g., within activist protest). Drawing on observational and 
transcription data, I reveal a set of value commitments held by those leading the NBEI, 
which invisibly defined a limited range of technological choices for roundtable members. 
These commitments also established energy decisions as the purview of technically 
trained experts. This study extends scholarly research on public engagements by making 
visible the possible role of value assumptions and conceptual frameworks in limiting their 
democratic potential. 
Résumé 
Dans le présent document, j’étudie la façon dont les tables rondes de l’Institut de 
l’énergie du Nouveau-Brunswick (IENB) ont été en mesure d’intégrer les préoccupations 
de la population à l’égard de la fracturation hydraulique, c’est-à-dire les préoccupations 
exprimées dans les milieux informels (p. ex. lorsqu’il y a une protestation militante). En 
m’appuyant sur des données d’observation et de transcription, je révèle un ensemble 
d’engagements fondés sur des valeurs que prônent les dirigeants de l’IENB, qui ont défini 
de manière invisible une gamme limitée de choix technologiques pour les membres de la 
table ronde. Ces engagements sous-entendent aussi que les décisions énergétiques sont du 
ressort des spécialistes ayant reçu une formation technique. La présente étude approfondit 
la recherche universitaire sur les engagements publics en rendant transparent le rôle que 
pourraient jouer les valeurs présumées et les cadres conceptuels dans la limitation de leur 
potentiel démocratique. 
Introduction 
Hydraulic fracturing is controversial across Canada, including in New Brunswick. Hydraulic 
fracturing, or “fracking,” is a controversial method for extracting natural gas or oil from shale deposits 
deep underground (for a history of the method, see Montgomery and Smith). Fracking involves 
drilling into shale deposits up to five thousand feet underground and then blasting chemically treated 
water into the shale to create small fissures, through which natural gas might flow back up to the 
surface for extraction. 
Although the practice of hydraulic fracturing has been used in so-called conventional wells 
since the 1940s, it is only within the past decade that drillers have begun to use a novel and more 
controversial method called directional or horizontal drilling (Mooney). There is public debate in New 
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Brunswick over possible governmental legislation of and investment in a fracking industry, and it is 
debate situated within wider conflicts, such as those over unsettled land claims. On 17 October 2013, a 
conflict between members of the Elsipogtog First Nation (a Mi’kmaq people) and U.S.-based SWN 
Corporation came to a violent standoff over the prospecting for shale gas and industrial development, 
which it likely precedes (for more details, see Howe). Fracking debates in the province are also 
situated against the backdrop of complex and historical interrelationships among science, technology, 
and workforce exposure from other industries like mining, as well as discontents over the operation of 
monopoly corporations, like Irving Oil Ltd., who have been responsible for energy industries (like 
coal mining) in the province since 1924. 
In response to this heated public debate in New Brunswick, the previous (Conservative) 
provincial government established the New Brunswick Energy Institute (NBEI) in 2013, with the 
thought that both scientific data and “a…dialogue was needed to determine the viability and safety of a 
shale gas industry and other energy development in the province” (New Brunswick Energy Institute). 
The provincial government initially funded the NBEI, but the institute soon attained independent status 
as a non-profit in May 2013. The organization has a mandate to bring independently derived evidence to 
energy policies in the province, as well as to provide “a public forum for debate on energy development 
in NB” (NBEI). The original Chair of the NBEI, Louis LaPierre, who was himself a government 
appointee, selected and appointed the roundtable members. Louis LaPierre was chosen for this role 
based upon his experience as a consultant to governments—both federal and provincial—on the 
environmental impacts of large infrastructure projects.2 
This paper focuses on the public dialogue mandate of the NBEI, which is advanced by its 
roundtable (see Figure 1 for the NBEI organizational structure and Table 1 for a list of roundtable 
members and their affiliations). Roundtable members were drawn from and are meant to represent the 
following “interest groups” or “stakeholders”: citizens, large oil and gas industry, government (in 
particular, Department of Energy and Mines and Department of Environment), local business 
community, First Nations, farmers, medical doctors, primary labourers/workers. Specifically, this 
paper investigates how citizen concerns that appear to be circulating outside of the roundtable 
processes were integrated into the NBEI roundtable dialogues. This analysis of the NBEI reveals the 
organization as providing much-needed and politically viable scientific information on hydraulic 
fracturing. However, textual analysis of NBEI roundtables reveals that these processes are structured 
to overemphasize technical issues related to fracking at the expense of social, political, and cultural 
issues relevant to energy decisions in New Brunswick that have been raised by activists in the 
province. Both executive members of the NBEI and technical experts invited to speak to roundtable 
members invisibly define what topics are brought to the table, demarcating a limited range of 
technological choices for energy development in the province and establishing boundaries as to what 
constitutes legitimate intervention into energy policy-making. As well, the textual data reveal that the 
roundtables have been organized within a conceptual framework that does more to maintain than 
disrupt current relationships of power in the province. 
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Figure 1. Organizational structure of the New Brunswick Energy Institute. 
Table 1. Membership and Affiliations of the New Brunswick 
Energy Institute Roundtable 
Name Affiliation 
Josée Albert Agricultural Alliance of NB 
Richard Blais  Worksafe NB 
Glen Cleland  UNB 
Léandre Desjardins Citizen 
Phil Desrosiers  Citizen 
Frédérick Dions Association francophone 
Jamie Gorman Tobique First Nation 
Susan Holt  NB Business Council  
Kathy Lambert Esgenoopetitj First Nation 
Donald MacPhail  Geologist/Economist 
Stephanie Merrill NB Conservation Council  
Dena Murphy  Corridor Resources 
Chad Peters SWN Resources Canada 
Sylvain Poirier NB Community College 
Michel Savoie  Ecologist (independent) 
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Background: Contours of the Fracking Debate in New Brunswick 
There are many actors involved in the fracking debate in the province. The provincial Minister of 
Energy and Mines is of course responsible for energy policy directly (by setting research and 
development spending priorities) and indirectly (by encouraging certain kinds of corporate activity 
through tax incentives or discouraging it through regulation). The previous provincial government had a 
clear pro-shale gas stance, but that Conservative government lost to a Liberal one in the fall of 2014 in 
an election that split the electorate between those in favour of and those opposed to fracking. In 
December 2014, Liberal Premier Brian Gallant introduced the Prohibition Against Hydraulic Fracturing 
Regulation, which placed a moratorium on fracking in the province. 
Even though the decisions about energy directions are ultimately the responsibility of politicians 
and bureaucrats, various interest groups have been trying to influence the conversation on fracking in 
New Brunswick. One interest group is the research community, which contains varying and often 
competing interests, including engineers and biologists, who appear cautiously in favour of fracking 
investment (Al et al.), and medical researchers and professionals, including New Brunswick’s chief 
medical officer of health, who are concerned about the possible socioeconomic and health impacts of 
boom-and-bust industrial development (Office of the Chief Medical Officer of Health). Social scientists 
like me are concerned principally with engaging ordinary citizens in the imagination of the province’s 
energy futures (see also Beckley). Other interest groups outside of the research community include 
members of the public and non-profit groups, who have been vocal about provincial policy directions. 
There are well established environmental groups (e.g., Conservation Council of New Brunswick) and 
unaffiliated environmental activists who express concern about the possible environmental and health 
impacts of fracking because it is a relatively new technical practice with dynamic technologies and 
methods, an unclear regulatory structure and inconclusive scientific evidence to support it (Conservation 
Council of New Brunswick; Hubner et al.). Political activists suggest that there is inherent inequity in 
the shale gas industry—egregious profiting for large corporations at the expense of community and 
environmental health. Members of First Nations have environmental, cultural, and land rights concerns 
(Howe). At the same time, many rural New Brunswickers are under-employed tradesmen and 
tradeswomen who support government investments in the industrial sector, including the shale gas 
industry (Carr), due to the potential for job creation. Finally, there are the corporations themselves: 
Corridor Resources, a resource extraction corporation who has been fracking in the province, and SWN, 
which is interested in more wide-scale resource exploration. This is undoubtedly a controversy, and one 
that has so far played out visibly within the mainstream and alternative media of the province (e.g., New 
Brunswick Media Co-op). 
NBEI as a Response to Public Debate 
The NBEI came about in the context of the complex public controversy over a possible fracking 
industry in New Brunswick described above. In 2011, the Conservative provincial government released 
the Energy Blueprint, which was meant to provide policy direction and a three-year action plan for the 
energy sector in New Brunswick (Department of Energy). One of their objectives was to gather 
stakeholder input (defined as input from citizens, industries, and other interest groups) in the production 
of another “blueprint,” this time more precisely dealing with oil and natural gas. That oil and gas 
investments in the province were an area of controversy became obvious during these input-gathering 
processes, which ended in May 2013 with the release of the Oil and Natural Gas Blueprint. The 
blueprint outlined guiding principles for the development of oil and natural gas policy decisions: 
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environmental responsibility, effective regulation and enforcement, community relations, First Nations 
engagement, stability of supply, and economic development (Department of Energy). The Conservative 
government founded the NBEI with the intention that it would further the objectives of this Oil and 
Natural Gas Blueprint in (1) producing a solid evidence base relating to the benefits and risks of 
fracking, and (2) providing a forum for roundtable dialogue between energy leaders and members of the 
public about these risks and benefits (NBEI). 
NBEI Roundtables in Their Broader Policy Context 
Policy-makers are increasingly dealing with controversial decisions by creating formal channels 
for debate. Innovations in the energy sector are especially contentious (Stankiewicz), and as a result the 
political bodies responsible for implementing energy innovations are more and more undertaking social 
dialogue with groups of interested actors or stakeholders. Dialogue-based policy tools, such as 
roundtables, are envisioned as formal mechanism by which governments can make decisions involving 
new practices and technologies for engaging members of the public in the anticipation and evaluation of 
the social, cultural, ethical, and political consequences of new technologies (Einsiedel; Rowe and 
Frewer; Joss and Brownlea; Durant; Irwin; Fischer; Morone and Woodhouse). In their ideal form, 
dialogues can enable democratic policies but also positive interconnections among science, technology, 
and society by (1) helping to understand the ethical, legal, and other social impacts of new technologies 
on individuals and society (Lewenstein); (2) enhancing social trust (Price and Cappella); and (3) 
reducing conflicts through the identification of common values and areas of policy agreement (e.g., 
International Risk Governance Council). 
The increasing use of dialogical policy-making comes about as part of a broader shift within 
policy away from expert-driven policy decisions, where expertise has been defined as the 
propositional knowledge of credentialed scientists (Wynne), to decision processes that engage 
ordinary citizens. Wherever a policy decision involves technical elements, the question arises: how is 
technical knowledge to be deployed within the policy process? Historically, the dominant response to 
this question was to put mechanisms in place for the efficient translation of technical knowledge into 
public policies (Gregory and Locke), where policy-makers explain their decisions to citizens in 
publicly accessible language. This public understanding of science and technology (PUST) approach 
to policy-making involves members of the public by correcting for their lack of scientific or technical 
knowledge on policy-relevant issues through public education campaigns (Brossard and Lewenstein). 
For instance, the Canadian government and biotechnology industry have attempted for decades to 
educate members of the public on the established safety of genetically engineered foods in order to 
bring these publics on board with already-occurring governmental investment in the biotechnology 
economy (Bronson, “Reflecting”). 
For decades, academic critiques have been leveraged against the public understanding model, for 
the most part focusing on the inaccuracy and inefficacy of efforts informed by it. Academic analysis has 
revealed that those who are well educated in science and technology are just as likely to protest against it 
(Bronson, “What We Talk About”). A significant problem is that PUST approaches to policy-making 
ultimately make those with credentials the source of information and authority in the planning process 
and thus lead to what Daniel Sarewitz calls scientized governance arrangements, ones that marginalize 
citizen knowledge and concern when it cannot be made sense of as properly scientific. PUST leads to 
technocratic policy-making, or policies made by those with technical expertise like engineers (Postman). 
A scientized and technocratic decision process around fracking, for example, would marginalize activist 
REVUE D’ÉTUDES SUR LE NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK ISSUE 7, NO. 2 (2016) 
http://w3.stu.ca/stu/sites/jnbs 76 
concerns that fracking in New Brunswick may lead to the concentration of corporate power in the 
province, thus exacerbating socioeconomic inequities. 
A different response to the question, “How is technical knowledge to be deployed within the 
policy process?” has been put forward by science studies scholars and some policy actors, who suggest 
that mechanisms should be put in place to facilitate informed public debate as the basis for workable and 
also democratic policy-making (Gregory and Locke). Opening up policy decision-making to a variety of 
social groups (including technical experts, other experts, interest groups, and citizens) is a way of 
establishing socially sustainable policies that command general public confidence (Guston). More recent 
policy language uses the term social licence to describe such policies (Prno and Slocombe). Critiques of 
PUST have translated into new policy-making processes in Denmark, the UK, and increasingly in the 
U.S. and Canada (Brossard and Lewenstein). Governments have deployed specific public engagements 
in policy-making through citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, planning cells, citizens’ panels, town 
halls, and roundtable meetings, each of which, broadly, brings together groups of citizens for useful 
deliberation and seeks to feed back the results of such deliberation into policy processes (Guston). One 
of the first dialogical technology assessments was a consensus conference hosted in 1999 by the Danish 
Board of Technology on the topic of genetically modified technologies. These dialogues were structured 
“in response to the perception of a heated public debate on the issue, which the Danish Board of 
Technology believed could benefit from informed public input” (Joss and Kluver 38). 
Despite the apparent enthusiasm for citizen engagement, existing empirical work on particular 
public engagements shows that their organization has to be considered with the utmost care to prevent 
the recapitulation of technocracy within engagement modes (Evans and Kotchetkova). The engagement 
exercises that came out of the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, as one Canadian example, 
failed to bring in democratic and robust policies because they privileged technical expertise over citizen 
participation in policy decisions (Prudham and Morris). 
Research Question and Method 
The historic dominance of scientized and thereby technocratic policy-making is the broader 
problematic within which this study is situated. The fracking debate in New Brunswick and the 
establishment of the NBEI provide an opportunity to explore the role of these specific roundtables in 
bringing citizen voices into energy policy-making. Specifically, I seek to find out how the NBEI’s 
roundtable processes account for the variety of issues raised by citizens outside of the roundtables—
issues that may be relevant to energy policy-making in the province. 
This research project arose from an invitation I received to participate in the NBEI; I declined the 
invitation because I had just moved to the province and was not familiar with the fracking debate or with 
local needs. As a researcher whose work focuses on maximizing democratic and sustainable outcomes 
from technologies, I was interested in the NBEI, and specifically its roundtable, as a possible object of 
research. The NBEI executive allowed me to observe two NBEI roundtable meetings (October 2013 and 
March 2014), and I use the observational data I gathered there as the foundation for this study. Further 
data for the study come from transcribed recordings of all the NBEI roundtable meetings (21 August 
2013; 21 October 2013; and 28 March 2014). My goal is neither to discredit the possibility that fracking 
holds for New Brunswick, nor to discredit the NBEI as a potentially helpful policy institution. Rather, 
the paper aims to critically evaluate the value of the NBEI roundtables in particular as mechanisms for 
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democratic decision-making, with the assumption that the recommendations coming from the NBEI will 
play some role in shaping energy directions for the province. 
Method 
I use a textual analysis of the transcribed audio recordings of three NBEI roundtable sessions (21 
August 2013; 21 October 2013; and 28 March 2014). The NBEI recorded the roundtable meetings, and 
their executives gave me the recordings in the form of digital audio files. As the organization is public 
and has transparency as one of its organizing principles, there was no requirement for me to guarantee 
the anonymity of the roundtable members or the NBEI executives. That said, in most scenarios the 
speakers did not identify themselves, and it did not seem necessary for me to use names in this paper. 
With the help of a research assistant, I transcribed the audio recordings, producing 161 pages of textual 
data for analysis. 
I performed the analysis using the open-source coding software Tams. I coded data inductively 
with attention to the problematic and the ways in which different views on energy were being brought 
into interaction. During the analysis process, I asked the following questions when coding the data: 
What appears to be the conceptual framing of the roundtable processes? How does the structure of the 
roundtable either enable or constrain the participation of particular participants or particular views? How 
does the language used by the roundtable members enable or constrain the participation of non-
normative forms of expertise? To what degree is the roundtable conversation dominated by technical 
rather than social, political, or cultural issues, needs, and concerns? What do participants’ statements 
take for granted, or what do they say about assumptions and values at play in the roundtable process? 
Theoretical Framework  
I bring a reflexive politics of knowledge approach to this study, informed by critical theories of 
communication, critical cultural theories, and science and technology studies approaches (Hall; 
Grossberg; Jasanoff). I take seriously the power of language in shaping the relationship between 
science and society. More precisely, I am interested in how technologies achieve social stability 
through social struggles over the control and distribution of meaning, central to which is language. 
Significantly, language always connects to power and difference; particular texts empower some 
possibilities and disempower others. I am interested in how the NBEI roundtable processes may be 
legitimating particular visions of energy technologies in New Brunswick, authoring some visions as 
viable for the province’s energy futures. My emphasis is on how those textual processes and the 
assumptions that appear to guide them may give power to particular actors and particular ways of 
approaching energy conversations. 
Results 
NBEI’s Goal of Generating Integrity through Science-based Truths 
One of the dominant categories to emerge from the data analysis was that of integrity. Integrity 
appears as a theme across the entire data set, though related categories of “trust” and “security” were 
also coded. At the first NBEI roundtable, held at the Chateau Moncton, the then-chair of the 
organization, Louis LaPierre, moderated the session. I did not attend this roundtable meeting, but the 
transcript begins with a presentation made to roundtable members by LaPierre. In outlining the mandate 
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of the institute, LaPierre described the NBEI as a neutral mechanism for delivering citizens the kinds of 
truths they expect to receive but are not getting from government: 
The NBEI emerged from a recommendation I made to government and they accepted and 
we are here today. NBEI was initiated after a listening tour across the province….One of 
the main issues [that arose during the listening tour] is government integrity. Many 
citizens of NB don’t believe that government will do what it says it’s going to do 
[laughs]…they are convinced of that. What I did say [to government] is if there is a 
potential for a shale gas industry in New Brunswick then we should try to understand it. 
It is well accepted that a lack of trust among citizens represents a legitimation crisis for policy-makers 
intent on making democratically accepted decisions (Habermas). Responding to citizens’ lack of trust in 
political institutions in New Brunswick, LaPierre recommended that the provincial leaders form an 
organization that could help to shape energy policies independent of vested financial and political 
interests. From the textual data, I see evidence of genuine attempts on the part of the NBEI executive at 
developing formal independence from government and industry. For instance, the NBEI is legally 
independent from government and roundtable members are protected under a liability policy that 
presumably is meant to allow them to speak critically, even against government and powerful interest 
groups. At the first roundtable meeting, Louis LaPierre stated, “[The NBEI has] obtained liability 
insurance for the institute. We incorporated as an independent research institute and we have a policy for 
each of you.” 
Interestingly, if integrity is linked to independence, it is clear from the data that the NBEI 
executive and those who formed the organization view science as synonymous with independence. The 
belief that deliberations should be “science-based” was another dominant category that emerged from 
the data set, where similar codes included “objective,” “evidence-based,” “scientific,” and “unbiased.” 
A bureaucrat from the Department of Energy and Mines spoke to the roundtable members at the first 
meeting and described the role of the NBEI (including the roundtable) as one of fostering truths about 
possible energy directions through the production of “science-based” information: 
It became clear to the [Conservative] government that in order to move forward, 
particularly for the development of the oil and gas resources in our province, independent 
research was needed in order to provide factual science-based and truthful information to 
both the public and government. Hence, the creation of the energy institution and its 
mandate, which is to study emerging issues in technology and to review, assess and 
inform the public and government. 
Also at this meeting, LaPierre described the NBEI as “an independent body, separate from government, 
[whose goal is] to examine the science surrounding energy development in New Brunswick. So we have 
science focus; we will look at science, evidence-based science, peer-reviewed.” 
Even the structuring of the roundtable meetings speaks to this presumption that science will help 
to generate integrity around the policy advice produced by the NBEI. Roundtable members are not 
“average” citizens—that is, uneducated in the technical matters at hand. Rather, participants are well-
educated professionals drawn from stakeholder groups involved in the wider provincial energy debates. 
These elite members are able to deal with discussion on technical matters. Despite their technical 
acumen, roundtable members are told at the first meeting that they are not experts compared to the 
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NBEI’s Scientific Advisory Council (SAC), which is populated by hard and natural scientists who “are 
in charge of looking at the science” (LaPierre, August 2013). One could imagine a role for the 
roundtable members in helping to direct the research programs and data collection of this advisory 
council—say, identifying areas of public concern that need research attention. This sort of dialogue 
between citizens, researchers, and policy actors would follow from the broad aims of participatory 
policy-making. Louis LaPierre does hint at such a role during the August 2013 meeting: 
The SAC are going to get issues that come forward to them from government, from 
industry, from the roundtable and general issues that would be collected from 
society….They’re going to distill these and then with technical committees, expert 
committees, they are going to look at the risks and do peer-review, they’re going to 
review the information and draft plans as to what needs to be done. 
But at the same meeting, LaPierre also suggests that the advisory council is itself directing the collection 
of an evidence base for energy policies, calling it the “executive branch” of the entire NBEI: 
The advisory council are the brains that sit around us and help move the institute along. 
They’re the executive body of the institute, they initiate and provide direction of the 
research and monitoring activity, they ensure scientific accuracy and the integrity of the 
whole institute. 
While there is clarity about the SAC’s role in generating integrity around energy 
recommendations made by the NBEI, there is ambiguity across the roundtable meetings about the role of 
the roundtable members. Members are variously told that their role is to receive questions and concerns 
from members of the public, to review documents coming from the advisory council, to “assess” (assess 
what exactly is not specified), to “examine the science on fracking,” to “understand the possibilities 
involved with shale gas industry,” and to facilitate (again, what exactly is not made clear). Based on the 
principles of public engagement, one might imagine a role for the roundtable in facilitating democratic 
relations among industry, government, and civil society. At their first meeting, LaPierre does say that 
“industry has concerns and government has concerns and we need to see how we might integrate the 
science....Society has concerns.” At this same meeting, LaPierre instructs the roundtable members to 
communicate the SAC’s scientific research to their “constituents,” a directive that appears to undercut 
his other claims at “facilitating democratic relations”: 
We would expect that most of you go back and share with your constituents….This is not 
confidential information but information you should share, you can get the information 
from the website. So this is part of our mandate….We do have a responsibility for 
conducting research and providing a flow of understanding to the public. 
During my observations of roundtable activity there was little time made available for members 
to discuss issues among themselves; predominantly, discussion was initiated and highly directed by 
NBEI executives. Textual data also reveal less discussion among roundtable members than presentations 
to the members delivered by invited experts—either from government, industry, or academia. The 
roundtable meetings I attended followed a similar pattern of presentations to members by the executive, 
followed by presentations to members by an outside expert, after which there was a short question 
period. It was during this question period that roundtable members brought their issues and concerns 
forward, although from my observations, which are supported by the textual data, members largely 
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limited their questioning to asking for clarification. There was little substantive critique made and I find 
no evidence of deliberation—the incorporation of alternative perspectives—having occurred within the 
NBEI roundtables based upon my reading of the textual data. Supporting this reading, I never witnessed 
such deliberation—there were no raised voices—during roundtable meetings. Furthermore, there 
appears to have been no revision of behaviour or direction by the NBEI, including the SAC, based upon 
roundtable dialogue. 
Roundtable members did challenge the lack of clarity regarding their specific role within the 
institute. At the first meeting one member asked, “Is there a communication linkage between different 
levels [of the NBEI]…like, will this roundtable ever see the actions and recommendations or the 
conversations of the SAC?” The chair, LaPierre, responded: “The conversations won’t be, but the 
recommendations will be.” By the third roundtable meeting, there is evident confusion among the 
members about the nature of their participation within the organization, particularly in relation to the 
work of the advisory council. One member said: 
That’s the piece we haven’t talked about as much—the meshing between the SAC and 
the roundtable. It’s still not entirely clear.…I have yet to have a sense for what we’re 
being asked to do as a roundtable with all the information we received today. I don’t 
know what SAC members will take from today and say, “Oh, clearly the roundtable 
wants us to pursue research on X,” because I don’t feel like we’ve achieved that….I’m 
still missing a gap between these two bodies. 
Three meetings in, a roundtable member interrogates the director, now David Besner, regarding 
the NBEI funding of a two-year project to assess domestic well-water quality. They ask how decisions 
are made on SAC research, and questions the fact that the NBEI is not giving roundtable members a role 
in directing SAC priorities: “Sorry, but just in reference to this project, I was hoping to better understand 
the decision-making process for deciding which projects get funded or supported, versus, like, how you 
seem to be calling for projects and decide [sic] which one to move ahead with.” 
Besner explained that this water research resulted from an “unsolicited proposal” brought to the 
NBEI by an academic researcher and SAC member (Dr. Kerry MacQuarrie) and that “it was a decision 
and if you’re asking how the decision is made, it is made by the SAC. Any other questions?” Dr. 
Maurice Dusseault, an environmental scientist and member of the SAC who was in attendance at this 
roundtable meeting, voiced a justification for the decision to fund this study: 
Methane comes up in burps so you can sample a well one day and the methane content is 
quite low and you can sample it one hour later and the methane content is quite 
high….So this series sampling of fifteen sub-selected wells, is really quite fairly 
important to helping us in Canada and the U.S. understand how the deep methane does 
percolate up from these sediments. (participant’s emphasis) 
Despite the fact that the study parameters appear to have been set before this roundtable 
meeting—the study was set to begin weeks after this meeting—there was an extended exchange between 
Dr. MacQuarrie, who was invited to the meeting as an expert presenter, and several roundtable members 
about sampling technique, possible privacy and access issues, and the public communication of results. 
It is not clear from the transcripts whether the advice of the roundtable members was taken up by the 
SAC. The textual data speak, then, to a policy organization aimed at growing democratic integrity 
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around energy commitments in the province, but one perhaps failing to fully empower roundtable 
members in this task. 
A Shared Assumption: Risk as a Technical Issue 
Even though roundtable members are told that science is being given separate consideration by 
the SAC, the textual data reveal that the majority of the roundtable dialogue focuses on risks associated 
with fracking, where risk is defined as a technical issue to be evaluated using highly reductionist 
scientific methods. This founding assumption about risk as a technical issue was never questioned or 
deliberated upon by roundtable members. A scientist and consultant, presenting to the roundtable 
members at the first meeting, describes the risk that the NBEI will evaluate this way: “L’évaluation des 
risques, c’est très importante parce que si on veut procéder à développer un programme scientifique, il 
faut être capable d’évaluer les risques.” 
As director, LaPierre (August 2013) described risk as something assessable via “scientific data,” 
which then guides regulations and industry standards: “We [the NBEI] are looking at current industry 
practices and the scientific data associated with it….We need to know the impact of new technology on 
the assumptions of current industry practices.” 
Another time (October 2013) he said, “Once we [the NBEI] obtain additional knowledge, it then 
should go back and interact with the rules and regulations that we have developed in the industry….We 
should test our rules and regulations to see if they work and we should address these science issues.” 
In the conceptualizations given in these quotations, risk is something to be understood by science 
and managed by government regulatory mechanisms; risk is a measurable technical issue instead of an 
overall stance toward possible outcomes from technologies—the kinds of outcomes that cannot be 
measured in advance. Strictly speaking, the conception of risk at work within the NBEI dialogues might 
not square with the realities of fracking as an engineering process. Fracking might indeed be a classic 
example of “post-normal” science where “facts are uncertain, values disputed, the stakes high” 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 739). Hydraulic fracturing is a relatively new and radically local technique 
where the attending possible impacts depend almost entirely on its very local geological and social 
context. What contamination has been reported in the peer-reviewed literature, which is just now 
surfacing, shows it being the product of very particular interactions of fracking contaminants with local 
organic matter (Volz et al.). Nonetheless, SAC members, roundtable members, and NBEI leaders appear 
to assume, as a starting point, that fracking is beneficial (just like any development) unless proven 
dangerous through a risk assessment founded on existing scientific measurements. What would likely be 
a controversial definition or framing of risk outside of the context of NBEI roundtables never arises 
therein as an object for dialogue, which suggests a shared assumption about the definition of risk among 
roundtable members. 
That the NBEI dialogues are founded on an assumption that risk is technical issue is presumably 
what pre-empts the NBEI roundtable members from discussing other risks related to provincial energy 
developments that can less easily be made sense of as scientific. One concern circulating in the informal 
debates on fracking in the province, which does not get discussed at the NBEI roundtables, is the 
complex and socially determined health risks associated with fracking development—in particular, with 
“boom-and-bust” economies that bring large and transient populations into rural areas for short periods 
of time. Such risks include the high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases among transient 
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industrial labourers, escalating rates of family dissolution and domestic violence and abuse, and stress-
related illnesses expressed in industrial labourers (Office of the Chief Medical Officer of Health; 
OCMOH). The province’s previous chief medical officer of health and other health workers in New 
Brunswick have raised concerns about over such socio-medical risk in the context of possible legislation 
of hydraulic fracturing (OCMOH). 
Another citizen concern that is not brought into the roundtable dialogue is the possible cultural 
risk associated with fracking, such as those Indigenous peoples have raised regarding the threat fracking 
poses to water’s cultural role for Aboriginal peoples. In fact, my textual analysis reveals that roundtable 
members share the assumption that water is a scarce “resource” with an economic value in its competing 
uses—namely industrial and recreational: “We have to pay attention to the impacts on water recreation” 
(SAC member). Cultural descriptions of water (e.g., as life force)—those that have been raised by 
Indigenous activists—however, do not appear in the roundtable dialogues. 
Assumptions about risk may be shared among those present at roundtable dialogues but they are 
also actively shaped by those in positions of power at the NBEI. Presentations made by technical experts 
to roundtable participants clearly shore up the scientistic conceptions of evidence by conditioning what 
is admissible as a valid subject for roundtable dialogue. As one example, in his invited presentation on 
hydraulic fracturing, a technically trained SAC member cautioned (March 2014) roundtable members 
against engaging in the telling of untruths that might compromise the capacity for economic and 
resource development in the province: 
You know, the people [east of Red Deer, Alberta] live with gas wells on their property 
fairly easily and the gas wells do not create huge environmental or social problems there. 
My point is that there are issues, but let’s talk about the real issues that we have to deal 
with, not issues that are made up by people that are ideologically driven. We have to deal 
with the truth, not phony issues, okay? 
The preceding quotation reveals that members are being called upon as disseminators (not creators) of 
truths to their respective “constituents” at the same time that they are being given a model for 
understanding “real” risk issues, which do not include concerns over the possible social and 
environmental effects of fracking. 
A Value Commitment: Technological Solutionism 
The textual analysis also indicates that the NBEI roundtables have been organized within and are 
proceeding according to a technological, solutionist Weltanschauung—a foundational assumption that 
investments in technological innovations will lead to a progressively better social condition (Smith and 
Marx). The technological solutionism that frames the NBEI roundtable dialogues converges with its 
scientist logic by espousing science-led progress in service of economic, as opposed to widely 
democratic, goals. “Progress” was a dominant word coded from the data, and there is continual mention 
among the executive of “moving on” or “moving forward” with energy “development” after the “proper 
scientific assessment,” or “stepwise process.” An energy policy-maker, invited as an expert presenter to 
speak to the first roundtable, remarked to members: 
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After the listening tour we faced two choices, a moratorium or a stepwise process. The 
steps I suggested are: First, we need to see if there is a resource and if there is, then what 
follows from this business case?...Five, after all this we should move on to exploration. 
Interestingly, the criteria for what would constitute progress are never explicitly brought forward as a 
topic for deliberation for roundtable members. Instead, the unstated and uncontested assumption that 
appears to be circulating at the roundtable is that investment in fracking technologies would constitute 
“moving forward” into an ideal future because of the economic gain that it will bring. A discussant 
from Siemens, a German-based engineering firm, opened with the following advice during the 
October roundtable: 
Because at the end of the day it’s kind of figuring out how to maintain our quality of life, 
right?…A big mandate for the energy institute is to say while more and more innovation 
is becoming available, how do we help NB understand those in context of the total 
system capability and reliability? 
Clarifying what he meant by innovation, the speaker asked rhetorically, 
We’re globally competing, right? This region is in competition for business capability 
with the world….You can’t think you’re innovating if you’re inventing something that 
already exists. You need to think about innovating something that no one has but the 
world needs. I really do understand doing the right thing for NB because that’s why we 
are here. 
Here, roundtable participants are encouraged to see their mandate as thinking innovatively, defined as 
mobilizing scientific “solutions” to energy qua economic “problems” on the basis of a technological 
solutionist understanding of the social good; participants are encouraged to see industrial innovation and 
market expansion as a panacea for New Brunswick citizens’ problems. 
There is no apparent consideration given to who exactly stands to benefit from the “business 
case” for fracking, and there is no conversation about bringing the energy needs of New Brunswickers, 
as have been articulated by citizens themselves—say, in the public protests—into these dialogues. For 
example, green energy technologies, like those being advocated for by local environmental activists (see 
Coon and Couture), are never explicitly the subject of dialogue for roundtable members—neither are 
they built into the deliberation of roundtable members. During the October 2013 roundtable meeting, a 
member initiated a discussion on renewable energy technologies. The NBEI director, then David Besner, 
shifted the conversation toward one about the limitations of energy storage technologies upon which the 
success of renewables ultimately hinges: 
Member: I’m just thinking…maybe gas isn’t necessarily what we should be putting all of 
our money into...because we’re actually in the centre...you know Quebec is selling energy 
for nothing to the States and we do have a nuclear power in NB....Maybe we’re putting 
too much on gas. 
Director: That’s entirely possible....Maurice discussed yesterday a bit about some new 
research going on in energy storage and the limitations of this technology, which is 
something we need in order to use renewables...because the wind doesn’t always blow, 
the sun doesn’t always shine. Maurice, I don’t know if you want to mention... 
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As the meeting, this conversation about renewables goes no further. Additionally, two 
representatives from NB Power presented to the October 2013 roundtable, which I attended. This well-
presented talk given by two junior, male employees at NB Power showcased a strategic plan to increase 
efficiency in the energy system through smart grids and other so-called green innovations. The 
presentation outlined possibilities for increasing the efficiency of the production and delivery system 
through renewables as well as the kinds of technological investments needed to make renewables 
feasible in the province: 
NB Power Representative 1: And that’s what this is all about...energy efficiency, energy 
conservation, energy efficiency as well as investment in smart grid. 
NB Power Representative 2: How do we integrate renewable energy?...Before it was 
more or less unidirectional from the generation to consumption, now at the local level we 
have the generation feeding back into the system....We are working on the PowerShift 
Atlantic project to use the customers’ loads to facilitate the integration and we believe 
with the help of smart grid infrastructure we can deliver new resources to the power 
system which will help the utilities as well as customers, and the customers may be able 
to participate in the service of utilities.  
There was no conversation on renewables at this meeting, however, as the roundtable broke for food, 
skipping questions in, as David Besner put it, “an effort to get closer to lunch.” 
The textual data from the meeting in March 2014 speak to predetermined commitments—
especially among those organizing the NBEI activities—to carbon-based energy investments as the 
technological solution to the province’s economic vulnerabilities. A representative from TransCanada 
Corporation was invited to present to the roundtable members about a pipeline for shipping domestic 
crude oil for refinery production in Canada. His presentation turned on economic gain: 
TransCanada rep: [The pipeline] displaces those higher-cost imports and also [allows] for 
expansion and upgrade opportunities for existing refineries. It increases the oil capacity 
from western Canada....We’re looking at an increase of $35.3 billion in gross domestic 
product for Canada during the development and construction in the first forty years of 
operation....What that means to NB, $2.8 billion increase in gross domestic 
product...close to $700 million in tax revenues for government agencies within the 
province of NB. These are some significant benefits. 
This discussion of the proposed pipeline turns social problems—widespread poverty and 
inequity—into commercial opportunity: locally processed oil for commodity export. This problem framing 
simplifies issues that are wide and complex and historically produced, and it also has the effect of 
discounting alternative techno-economic solutions. Curiously, this framing of the proposed TransCanada 
pipeline in terms of economic gain gets taken up by roundtable members, even those representing 
“stakeholder” groups whom have otherwise contested the pipeline on environmental grounds: 
Roundtable member: Okay, so I’m just trying to make sure that these are actual benefits 
that New Brunswick is going to get or if these are payments made to landowners that they 
are then going to turn around and pay their property taxes with….That’s not really a gain 
to the government.  
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Ultimately, the results of this study raise further questions: Why are particular technological 
policy directions apparently being favoured over others? Why does this favouring go un-critiqued by 
roundtable members? Finding an answer to this is important, but beyond the scope of this data set; 
however, it is worth noting that the dominant techno-utopic vision at the NBEI supports existing power 
structures and already powerful actors, such as large energy oil and gas corporations. 
Discussion 
The intentions behind the development of the New Brunswick Energy Institute appear to align 
with the goal of public engagement efforts at large: to gather democratic input in the formation of 
technical policy-making in the hope of making decisions that prove robust against social criticism 
because they are perceived to respond to citizen needs. Unfortunately, this study’s analysis suggests a 
scientization of the NBEI, which limits its democratic potential. 
Roundtable meetings are dominated by technical concerns over the non-technical considerations 
that have been raised by citizens outside of these roundtables, such as the environmental activist concern 
about the political implications of fracking as support for monopoly corporate interests. It appears that 
the possibility of incorporating social, cultural, and political considerations into energy policy 
recommendations during the roundtables is closed off partly by the organizational structure of the 
dialogues: roundtable members are limited to distributing the technical advice given by invited experts 
and the Scientific Advisory Council to members of the public. The general selection of roundtable 
members appears well-considered to fulfill the task of communicating scientific information coming 
from the SAC, rather than for meeting the minimal criteria for democratic deliberation (Fung): there is 
an over-representation of the highly educated that does not reflect the high percentage of undereducated 
people in the province. Given this membership, and given that SAC members are present during 
roundtable discussions, it is unsurprising that the roundtable conversation turns on the technical issues 
that fracking raises. 
Furthermore, NBEI roundtables are scientized in the assumptions circulating at roundtable 
dialogues. Notably, it appears that discussions of social needs and priorities vis-à-vis energy 
technologies have been pre-empted by a narrow conception of risk as hazards that can be known by 
technical measure. This conceptualization of risk is problematic from a democratic perspective because 
any consideration of the social and cultural risks of energy developments, such as those brought forward 
by Indigenous and environmental activists or health-care professionals, finds no epistemic space at the 
NBEI roundtables.  
The NBEI’s scientized structure is likely borne from the earnest desire among those who brought 
this organization into being to limit the controversy surrounding energy policy commitments. 
Scientization quite often emerges in policy situations—like the fracking controversy in New 
Brunswick—thought to be otherwise mired in environmentalist, economic and other extrinsic interests. 
This vision for the role of science in democracy—a scientific approach to democracy as opposed to a 
democratic approach to science (Sarewitz)—is premised on normative assumptions about science as 
value-neutral (Merton). In the common view, science is supposed to cut through self-interest, rhetoric, 
and short-term thinking because science seeks truth. According to this way of thinking, scientists take a 
“view from nowhere”—the so-called “God’s eye view” (Haraway). Sarewitz describes the common 
assumptions behind scientized debates: 
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If politics is the arena of the irrational then science is the only rational player in the game 
and scientific truth must be a guiding parameter for wise political decision making. 
According to this perspective, science could resolve a multitude of thorny political 
problems that confront people and nations if only humanity would rely on facts instead of 
perception of the facts. (“Frontiers” 72) 
Unfortunately, scientized energy policy-making is unlikely to result in policies that achieve 
social legitimacy and public support. The NBEI undoubtedly serves an important policy function in 
collecting some politically valuable information, and surely only the most anti-science zealots would 
argue against the value of evidence-informed policy. To be sure, Hübner, Horsfield, and Kapp suggest 
that a lack of “fact-based information about shale gas, especially regarding the potential environmental 
risks related to its production, is one reason behind the debate” (3921). But numerous case studies (e.g., 
Nelkin; Wynne) suggest that controversies with technical underpinnings, like the fracking debate in New 
Brunswick, cannot be resolved solely by technical means, through consideration of scientific 
information, or by so-called experts acting alone (Sarewitz, “Frontiers” 385). For one, there are almost 
always social, political, and cultural issues that cannot be addressed when the controversy is dealt with 
only on a technical register. Furthermore, treating a debate as if it is about technical matters alone 
actually works to make invisible the value commitments necessarily embedded within conversations that 
appear to turn on value-neutral science (Kinchy; Rayner). How the SAC deals with “facts” about water, 
for example, depends upon how water is conceptualized; in other words, factual treatment of water data 
is actually premised upon particular value commitments, like the commitment to treat water as a 
resource in the first place. Thus, not only are expressions of social, cultural, and political ideas, issues, 
needs, and concerns suppressed in a scientized debate, but value-based commitments—say, to monopoly 
industries—remain beyond reproach, hidden behind the perception that the debate is being carried out in 
unbiased terms. That particular energy commitments are dominating the attention of the NBEI at the 
expense of others (i.e., fracking versus renewables) is problematic, but it is further problematic that 
these commitments become hidden through the institute’s scientization, and are thus removed from the 
democratic scrutiny that the institute purports to further. In February 2016, the New Brunswick 
Hydraulic Fracturing Commission—established in 2014 by the newly elected Liberal premier—
published a report that supports the findings of this study. The commission suggested that all previous 
public engagements on fracking in New Brunswick—including the roundtables of the NBEI—have been 
characterized by 
expert panels that have studied the issue from a technical and scientific perspective, 
weighing the pros and cons of the scientific literature. Science-based research is critically 
important to understanding the technical aspects of this issue—and this report relies 
heavily on the work of the technical experts—but it alone cannot guide the development 
of effective public policy (2). 
Conclusion 
This study of a local public engagement process alerts us to a broader conclusion: public 
participation exercises can be implicated in producing (or reproducing) particular interests and 
relationships of power. The deployment of participatory initiatives within technical policy-making has 
received mixed reviews by social scientists. Some studies describe limitations on the extent to which the 
public is able to influence policy by these mechanisms. David Chandler suggests that public 
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participation in local governance is often merely a “therapeutic” exercise intended to garner public 
confidence in a system that remains essentially centralized (11). Thorpe and Gregory are concerned that 
engagements create spaces where the dust, like that thrown up by street protest and burning police cars, 
is actively settled through the norms of deliberation—such as reasonableness, moderation, and 
dispassion—in a way that discounts the concerns of the “unruly masses” (see also Elam and Bertilsson). 
This essay has attempted to extend existing critical examinations of public engagement exercises by 
making visible the possible limitations of engagement vis-à-vis the more hidden value assumptions and 
conceptual frameworks that comprise its constituent elements. The NBEI’s value commitments appear 
to have invisibly defined a limited range of technological choices for its roundtable members (and 
possibly their “constituents”) and to have established boundaries around energy policy-making as the 
purview of technically trained experts. The question now becomes, What can be done to construct the 
possibility for the shaping of alternative visions, both for technical policy-making as well as for this 
province’s energy futures? 
Kelly Bronson is the Acting Director of Science and Technology Studies at St. Thomas University. Her 
research has been in ethnographic studies of technological engagement and use. 
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1 I would like to acknowledge the support of the Office of Research Services at St. Thomas University 
and the valuable help of my research assistant, Scott Babin. 
2 LaPierre also had close ties to industry and in particular to JD Irving Ltd., New Brunswick’s largest 
forestry corporation. LaPierre was the first ever Irving Chair at the Université de Moncton, in which 
position he advised the corporation on sustainable forestry practices. A side story to the one at issue in 
this paper, LaPierre was removed from the position of chair of NBEI after it was revealed that he had 
actively falsified his credentials for the forty years of his active science advisory career. 
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